We consider the link between poverty and subjective well-being, and focus in particular on the role of time. We use panel data on 42,500 individuals living in Germany from 1992 to 2010 to uncover three empirical relationships. First, life satisfaction falls with both the incidence and intensity of contemporaneous poverty. Second, poverty scars: those who have been poor in the past report lower life satisfaction today, even when out of poverty. Last, the order of poverty spells matters: for a given number of poverty spells, satisfaction is lower when the spells are concatenated. As such, poverty persistence reduces well-being. These effects differ by population subgroups.
Introduction
The relationship between an individual's income and their subjective well-being has been the focus of much empirical work, both within and across countries, and both at a single point in time and over time. This existing research has come to three main conclusions: 1) within each country at a given point in time, richer people are more satisfied with their lives, with additional income increasing satisfaction at a decreasing rate; 2) within each country over time, an increase in average income does not substantially increase satisfaction with life; and 3) across countries, on average, individuals living in richer countries are more satisfied with their lives than are those living in poorer countries (see, amongst many others Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004 , Clark et al., 2008b , Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2002 , Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006 , Easterlin, 1995 , Frey and Stutzer, 2002 , and Senik, 2005 .
While there is now something of a consensus with respect to the above, it is noteworthy that the majority of the analysis in this burgeoning subjective well-being literature has been resolutely atemporal (whereby some measure of current well-being is related to current income), with relatively few exceptions which we will discuss below.
However, at the same time, a considerable amount of recent work in various fields of economics has underlined the importance of the past as a determinant of today"s outcomes and individual behaviors. This paper therefore combines two flourishing literatures, one on poverty and the other on subjective well-being. We here consider a number of different relationships between poverty and subjective well-being, emphasizing the role of time. We first focus on the contemporaneous relationship between income poverty and life satisfaction.
Although it is well known that richer individuals are more satisfied with their lives, no existing work has, to the best of our knowledge, analyzed income poverty per se. We show that self-reported satisfaction with life is indeed lower for those who are classified as being in poverty. As might be expected, not only the fact of being in poverty, but also its intensity (i.e. the relative distance from the poverty line) affects subjective well-being.
In terms of current individual well-being, there are a number of possible different ways in which time may matter. The first way in which the past affects the present is via the consequences of completed past events. Take for example unemployment. Here, the well-being of the currently employed may be lower if they have experienced unemployment in the past, either due to another anticipated unemployment spell (unemployment begets unemployment) or lower contemporaneous earnings. This phenomenon is often called "scarring" in the labor economics literature. Analogously, a past experience of poverty may still continue to scar the individual even when they subsequently move out of poverty. In this respect, Cappellari and Jenkins (2004, p.598) note that "the experience of poverty itself might induce a loss of motivation, lowering the chances that individuals with given attributes escape poverty in the future".
We then consider the role of past completed poverty spells, and conclude that poverty scars: past episodes of poverty significantly reduce current life satisfaction.
Our last contribution refers to recent work in the deprivation literature on sequences of poverty spells. The broad question that is asked here is: Given a number of years spent in poverty, is it worse to spend these in one long spell or a larger number of shorterduration spells? The former is said to represent more persistent poverty. We here show that persistent poverty is worse: past years of poverty that were more stuck together have an additional depressive effect on current well-being.
These effects differ across population subgroups. In particular, time seems to matter much less in general for older individuals: poverty does not scar for this group, nor does the persistence of poverty matter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a brief review of poverty measurement, while Section 3 considers some of the work on time in Economics, and in particular with respect to subjective well-being. Section 4 then describes the SOEP panel data that we use, and the results appear in Section 5. Last, Section 6 concludes.
Measuring Poverty
The seminal contribution to poverty measurement is Sen (1976) , who distinguishes two fundamental issues: (i) identifying the poor in the population under consideration;
and (ii) constructing an index of poverty using the available information on the poor.
The first problem has been dealt with in the literature by setting a poverty line and identifying as poor all individuals with incomes below this threshold. The way in which this poverty line is determined remains very much debated and differs considerably between countries (for an extensive survey see World Bank, 2005, Chapter 3). In this paper we follow the European Union approach, in which the poverty line equals 60% of the national median equivalent income (see Section 4 for details).
Regarding the second issue, the aggregation problem, many indices have been proposed which capture not only the fraction of the population which is poor or the incidence of poverty (the headcount ratio), but also the extent of individual poverty and inequality amongst those who are poor. We here follow the approach proposed by Foster et al. (1984) . is given by their relative shortfall from the poverty line, i.e.
where   0 is a parameter. When  = 0, the only dimension of poverty which counts is its incidence, as normalized deprivation is equal to one for all of the poor. When  = 1, normalized deprivation also reflects the intensity of poverty with a higher value of d being assigned to poorer individuals. The normalized deprivation score for the rich, those whose incomes (weakly) exceed z, is always set equal to zero.
The literature on poverty measurement has advanced to a considerable degree of sophistication since Sen (1976) . However, the explicit inclusion of time has not been at the forefront of these developments. Only recently have a number of measures of intertemporal poverty been proposed, as opposed to indices where attention is limited to a single-period. The Journal of Economic Inequality recently published a special issue on measuring poverty over time, the introduction to which (Christiaensen and Shorrocks, 2012) provides an exhaustive summary of the literature.
Various approaches exist for the measurement of poverty over time. Without going into specifics, it may be useful to distinguish the persistence of poverty from what we think of as being in chronic poverty. Generally speaking, we think of chronic poverty as applying to a situation in which an individual is in poverty for a considerable number of the time periods under consideration. This does not however necessarily mean that any attention is paid to the durations of unbroken poverty spells, given the total number of periods spent in poverty. To illustrate, if an individual is poor for six periods out of ten, say, does it matter if these six periods occurred consecutively, or in two blocks of three periods, or three blocks of two periods? The notion of persistence to which we appeal here explicitly takes the continuity of poverty spells into consideration. Chronic poverty then refers to the frequent occurrence of poverty, while persistent poverty requires, in addition to frequency, that poverty be manifested in periods that are more consecutive.
Our empirical analysis will apply the measure of persistent poverty proposed by Bossert et al. (2012) , while the index of chronic poverty comes from Foster (2009) . indicates that the individual spent the first three periods in poverty, one period out of poverty and then returned to poverty in the final period. The first spell of poverty is of length 3 while the last is of length 1. Similarly, (1, 1, 0, 1, 1) indicates that the individual spent the first two periods in poverty, one period out of poverty and then returned to poverty for two additional periods. Both spells of poverty in this second case are of length two. The index of individual poverty persistence proposed by Bossert et al. (2012) weights each spell by its length, l. It is the weighted average of the individual normalized deprivation scores where, for each period, the weight is given by the length of the spell to which this period belongs:
with   0 being a parameter.
For the first example given above, (1, 1, 1, 0, 1), the index value is
. For the second example, (1, 1, 0, 1, 1), the index value is
. The BCD index then does more than simply count the number of periods which are spent in poverty (which are the same in both examples). When  = 0, the index captures the incidence of persistent poverty while when  = 1 the depth of poverty is also taken into account.
In the empirical application below using subjective well-being data, we will normalize this index to values between   1 , 0 by dividing the values above by T.
The index of chronic poverty we use in this paper is that proposed by Foster (2009), which is simply the average poverty that an individual has experienced over time, that is:
with   0 being a parameter. When  = 0 we measure the average incidence of poverty the individual faced, while when  = 1 we calculate the average relative shortfall from the poverty line over all of the periods for which the individual is observed.
Some Existing Literature and Our Hypotheses
It is well known that many subjective well-being measures are left-skewed, so that many people report quite high scores, and that on average richer individuals are more satisfied with their lives than are the less rich: a useful recent summary using Gallup World Poll data is Diener et al. (2010) . However, almost no work, to the best of our knowledge, has considered income poverty as such as a determinant of satisfaction with life in a multivariate setting. Following Clark et al. (2014) , we here first look at the effects of both being poor and poverty intensity (d 0 and d 1 in the terminology above). Drawing on the recent literature on measuring poverty over time, we also include measures of the poverty that the individual has experienced in the past (F and BCD in the terminology above) as determinants of their current well-being.
The central role of the past in determining today"s outcomes and behaviors can be found in a number of recent contributions across a variety of fields of economics. In the finance literature, past personal experience has been shown to be a key determinant of current investor behavior (see, among others, Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008, and Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) . There is also an effect of the past on attitudes in general. Fernández et al. (2004) , for example, argue that the growing number of men brought up in a family in which the mother worked has been a significant factor in the increase in female labor-force participation over time. This transmission has also been noted with respect to educational outcomes (see, among others, Wolpin, 1994, and Behrman et al., 1999) .
This past personal experience need not only be within the household. When these past experiences are at some aggregate level, the problem of causality over time is alleviated (my current risk-aversion, for example, cannot have caused the regional unemployment rate when I was growing up). Some well-known examples of such transmission include Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) , who show that East Germans (presumably as a result of their history) are currently more pro-redistribution than are West Germans. Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) equally use data from the 1987 and 1992 International Social Survey Program surveys to consider the distribution of incomes across occupations that respondents consider as fair. One of their main results is that the income distribution considered to be fair by respondents in ex-Communist countries is tighter than that of respondents in Western countries (but that this gap has narrowed over time).
Regarding the labor market, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) explicitly use the arrow of time and consider the role of economic growth experienced during the ages of 18 and 25 on the individual's current beliefs regarding fairness in the US General Social Survey. Blake (2012) uses a battery of indicators of the individual's environment between birth and the age of 16 (parental unemployment, household financial situation, and the regional GDP growth rate), and shows, using US Health and Retirement Survey data, that some of these are significantly predicted with both current beliefs (regarding the individual"s perception of the likelihood of future recession, and of own personal job loss) and risk-related behaviors (investment in shares, and the making of a will).
Last, some relatively new work has appealed to cohort data, in which individuals (or their parents) are repeatedly interviewed over periods of many decades (a longer period than even the longest available panel data allows), to show how factors present at childbirth relate to outcomes at very young ages, which in turn feed through to outcomes at adolescence, and so on all the way up to outcomes when the individual is in their 30s or 40s. Two such examples are Frijters et al. (2014) and Layard et al. (2014) .
We here want to analyze the relationship between income and subjective wellbeing, taking the past into account. But we do not want to consider all incomes as equal, as it were: we are particularly interested in the well-being repercussions of poverty.
While we suspect that there is a relationship between income and subjective well-being at all levels of income, there is no guarantee that this relationship be the same across the income distribution (see Budria, 2013 , for an explicit analysis with respect to income comparisons). In particular, poverty is a complex phenomenon which affects all of the psychological, social and economic dimensions of an individuals' life, and it is unclear whether its relationship to subjective well-being can be inferred from the general analysis of income. As in Clark et al. (2014) , our first question here then explicitly considers the relationship between both the incidence and intensity of current income poverty and current well-being.
We also take into account the mediating role of time. As opposed to Clark et al. (2014) , where the focus is on adaptation, we next ask what happens to individual wellbeing once the poverty spell is over, i.e. the individual is no longer poor. Carrying on with our unemployment example, does the fact of having had an unemployment spell in the past reduce the current level of well-being when back in work? If so, past exposure can have ongoing current effects, even when the past spell is finished. This kind of "scarring" effect was originally used in labor economics to refer to the effects of past (involuntary) unemployment on current labor-market earnings (see Ruhm, 1991, for example). More recent incarnations of this literature have asked whether past unemployment reduces the current well-being of individuals. Work on the SOEP (Clark et al., 2001 ) does find evidence of such a correlation. It is an open question as to why such scarring effects occur. Knabe and Rätzel (2011) also appeal to SOEP data to argue that scarring may come about via future expectations: past exposure to a negative event may make individuals more scared of its future reappearance, a finding which has been re-examined in European Social Survey data by Lange (2013) . We will here consider whether past poverty exposure affects current subjective well-being, ceteris paribus.
Our third question considers the sequence of exposure to poverty. While about 15% of the households we consider here will have experienced poverty at least in one year, their exposure to poverty differs markedly. Some will have been poor only once, others will have been poor many times. And amongst the latter, some households will have been poor continuously for a number of years, while others will have moved in and out of poverty. We will address both of these concerns: the number of times the household has been poor and the order of their poverty spells matters. In particular we will ask whether, for a given number of poverty spells, subjective well-being is lower when the spells are concatenated. If this is the case, poverty persistence reduces well-being. 
Data and Methods
Our empirical analysis of the link between poverty and subjective well-being is carried out using one of the most extensively-used panel datasets in the subjective well- The individual income measure we employ for most of our analyses is annual equivalent household income. We here control for differences in household size and therefore economies of scale by applying an equivalence scale with an elasticity of 0. Our regression analyses will control for age (eight age groups, from 16-20 to 80+ years old), marital status (separated, single, divorced, widowed), whether employed, residency in East or West Germany, years of education, and number of children in the household. Since we run fixed-effect specifications, no time-invariant variables such as sex and immigration status appear in the regression. Year dummies are included but the coefficients are not reported.
In order to better account for heterogeneity, the analysis is performed first for the entire population and then for subgroups by gender and age. For the latter, we cut the sample at age 60. These population partitions are inspired by work showing that life satisfaction and adaptation to various life events differ by age and sex (see, for example, Clark et al., 2008a) .
The descriptive statistics of our main sample appear in Table 1 and Figure 1 . Our 332,000 observations correspond to around 42,700 subjects, who are thus observed on average almost 8 years each. The majority of the sample is of working age and is either married (63%) or single (24%). Approximately 62% of the sample is employed at the moment of the survey. Around 12% of observations correspond to respondents whose equivalent income was below 60% of the yearly median income that year: these are the observations corresponding to the poor in our empirical analysis. The average value of our dependent variable, life satisfaction, is close to seven on the zero to ten scale, indicating that there are no striking ceiling or floor effects on average. Life satisfaction is strongly correlated with age, showing in Figure 1 the typical U-shape followed by a subsequent drop for the over 65s. It is difficult to disentangle cohort from age effects;
however, our regression analysis will control for individual fixed-effects.
The distribution of poverty by age and gender does not exactly mirror that of life satisfaction. Poverty prevalence is completely U-shaped in age. This is as expected, as earnings tend to peak in the 50s and retirement is typically associated with sharply lower real incomes. However, Figure 1 does suggest that life satisfaction and poverty are related. This is confirmed by the data. Well-being scores of zero to two are reported by 2% of the sample, 27% of whom are in poverty; the analogous figures for well-being scores of eight to ten are 40% and 9% respectively.
Throughout the paper, in order to make full use of the panel nature of our data, and in line with most of the literature on well-being, we use fixed-effects estimation. This allows us to control for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics and any potentially different use of the underlying satisfaction scale across individuals. The general model then takes the form:
where C it is the set of time-varying individual covariates and PI it a series of poverty indices at the individual level. Depending on the question addressed, both the sample and the form of the PIs will change. With the fixed effect in [4] , α i , the estimated coefficients on both C it and PI it are identified off of within-subject changes in these variables over time. We therefore run "within" fixed-effect linear regressions.
We first establish the relationship between both the incidence and intensity of contemporaneous poverty and life satisfaction: these turn out, unsurprisingly, to be negative. We then introduce time explicitly, and ask whether poverty has a scarring effect on well-being, that is if the life satisfaction of those who are currently out of poverty is lower if they have been poor in the past. Last, we consider the role of persistence, whereby the order of poverty spells matters: For a given number of poverty spells, is satisfaction lower when the spells are concatenated?
Results

Current poverty incidence and intensity
This section borrows from Clark et al. (2014) . We start with the simplest question:
the effect of contemporaneous poverty on subjective well-being. Table 2 shows the results from fixed-effect regressions of life satisfaction, in which the estimates refer to within-subject variation.
The regressions include various control variables, which attract the expected coefficients: life satisfaction is U-shaped in age, at least up until age 80. The U-shape seems sharper for women than for men. Education attracts a positive significant but small coefficient in the overall sample, although it is worth remembering that many individuals will not change their years of education over time. Those who marry are more satisfied, while widowhood and separation are associated with lower life satisfaction, especially for women. The divorced are estimated to be more satisfied in this fixed-effects regression, which is consistent with higher well-being as compared to a failing marriage (these are within-subject regressions). This positive effect is found for male and younger respondents. 1 With respect to labor-force status, we find a positive estimated coefficient, as expected, for employment.
More novel, and central to our research question, are the coefficients on the various poverty measures. At the top of almost zero) has a life satisfaction score that is 0.135 points lower than the same individual in the same household when that household is not poor; this effect is of the same magnitude as the happiness boost from marriage.
Scarring
The above section established that contemporaneous poverty and well-being are correlated. We now introduce time, and ask whether past poverty has a scarring effect on the well-being of those who are currently not poor. We do so by including a dummy into the regression which indicates whether an individual has experienced poverty in the past.
Since individuals who are observed for shorter periods may not provide evidence of the medium-/long-run effect we are interested in, we only consider individuals who are observed for at least ten years (although any time restriction we introduce actually does not particularly affect the qualitative results we find). This estimation approach will introduce some bias if individuals leave the survey precisely because they have become poor. However, this is not the case in our panel: poverty incidence is the same for both the excluded and included samples.
The results appear in Table 3 . Past poverty experience reduces the life satisfaction of the currently non-poor: poverty is not then ephemeral but has well-being effects that extend beyond the end of the poverty spell. The overall negative coefficient in column 1
of Table 3 seems to be driven mainly by women and those aged 60 and under. The experience of past poverty is not significant for older respondents (although this is arguably due to a larger standard error, as the estimated coefficient is similar to that for the younger group).
Chronic and persistent poverty
The last question we wish to address also relies on the notion of time in the impact of poverty on subjective well-being. Instead of looking at the existence of a past poverty spell, as above, we here take into account the individual"s entire cumulated experience of poverty. In this context, we not only consider the past number of years spent in poverty (which reflects chronic poverty, as discussed in Section 2), but also ask whether a given number of poverty years reduce well-being more if they are consecutive (which picks up the separate effect of the persistence of poverty).
Our last regression then includes both lagged average past cumulative poverty,
given by the Foster index (measuring chronicity, equation [ past has a less-negative effect on current well-being than does one longer exposure. In the overall sample, the associated coefficient is negative but just insignificant at the ten per cent level. In the sub-regressions, poverty persistence is not significant for women or the elderly, but does matter for men and those aged up to 60. For women then the chronic dimension of poverty counts more than its persistence, while for men it is the other way round. In both cases, however, previous poverty clearly affects current well-being.
It is worth underlining that this combination of the indices is asking a lot of the data, as all coefficients here are identified off of the separate movements in both past poverty incidence (L.Foster 0 ) and persistence (L.BCD 0 ) for the same individual in different waves of the SOEP. A version of Table 4 which includes only L.Foster 0 or only L.BCD 0 yields consistent results, with these always being negatively and significantly correlated with well-being, except for the elderly.
Do the results depend on the choice of the poverty line?
One concern with the above analysis is the choice of the "right" poverty line. In line with EU practice we consider a relative poverty line given by 60% of the median of the distribution of equivalent income. Although this is a very common assumption, it can easily be argued that this line is too high or too low: especially as we are here interested in individuals feeling, rather than objectively being, poor. A poverty line that is too high will "dilute" poverty"s impact, by defining as poor some individuals who do not see themselves as such (and, consequently, may not report lower well-being); a line that is too low conversely assigns some people who are poor (and unhappy) to the non-poor group.
As it is difficult to be sure a priori which definition is the best, we re-ran our analyses with different poverty lines. Specifically, we set the poverty line equal to a changing percentage (40%, 50%, 70% and 80%) of the median income. These results are available on request. The negative and significant effect of contemporaneous poverty (incidence and intensity) on life satisfaction prevails in all cases. The past continues to count significantly, except at the extreme values. Specifically, with a 40% poverty line we lose significance on our BCD variable picking up persistence. In a sense this is understandable, as lower poverty lines progressively eliminate poverty spells, meaning we end up with less variance (especially within individual) in our data. With an 80% poverty line, neither of the past poverty measures (L.Foster 0 and L.BCD 0 ) are significant in the overall sample, although they continue to occasionally be so in the sub-samples. A high poverty line does seem to dilute the effect of poverty on well-being, especially where the past is concerned.
Conclusion
We have here used long-run panel data to analyze the effects of poverty on individual well-being, taking individual fixed effects into account. We show that both the incidence and intensity of poverty reduce life satisfaction. Our main results relate to the effect of time. We find that past poverty scars current well-being. In addition, the sequence of poverty spells matters. For the same number of years of poverty exposure, life satisfaction is lower when all of the years are clumped together rather than split up into periods in and out of poverty. This ties in with the idea that individuals may have the resources (financial or otherwise) to deal with relatively short-run poverty periods, but not poverty that lasts too long. Periods out of poverty may allow individuals to replenish these resources (as suggested by Dutta et al., 2013) , so that movements in and out of poverty are not as bad as one uninterrupted poverty spell.
We believe that these results are important in three ways. First, they represent new information on the relationship between poverty and subjective well-being explicitly taking the past into account. We have shown that both current and past poverty matter, even in a rich country. Second, we have provided a bridge between theory and empirics, Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; the regressions include all of the other control variables in Table 2 . 
